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A New Board Policy on Deferral to Arbitration: 
 Acknowledging and Delimiting Union Waiver of 
Employee Statutory Rights 
Michael C. Harper*  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In late 2009, the Office of the General Counsel of the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) published an Operations-Management Memoran-
dum (O-M Memorandum)1 advising regional directors and other Board 
officers that “a new approach to cases involving arbitral deference may be 
warranted.”2  The Memorandum indicated a new approach might be guided 
by the Supreme Court’s decision in 14 Penn Plaza, LLC v. Pyett,3 and a 
separate older line of decisions in the District of Columbia Circuit Court of 
Appeals.4  The O-M Memorandum noted the District of Columbia Circuit 
decisions had advanced a theory of implied contractual waiver to require 
complete Board deference to the arbitration process in most cases.  It then 
compared this implied waiver theory with the Penn Plaza Court’s require-
ment that any union waiver of an employee’s access to a judicial forum for 
statutory claims must be expressed in “clear and unmistakable” terms.5  The 
Memorandum also contrasted both of these waiver standards with the 
“Spielberg/Olin standards” the Board currently uses to determine whether 
to defer its resolution of unfair labor practice claims to an arbitrator’s com-
pleted resolution of contractual claims.6  The Memorandum concluded by 
                                                                                                                           
      *      Michael  C.  Harper  is  Professor  of  Law  and  Barreca  Labor  Relations Scholar at Boston 
University School of Law.
 
 
1 Office of the General Counsel, Division of Operations-Management, Memorandum OM 10-13 
(CH), Nov. 3, 2009 [hereinafter O-M Memorandum]. 
 2 Id. at 2. 
 3 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009). 
 4 The O-M Memorandum cited Plumbers & Pipefitter Local Union No. 520 v. NLRB, 955 F.2d 
744 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and Titanium Metals Corp. v. NLRB, 392 F.3d 439 (D.C. Cir. 2004).   O-M Memo-
randum, supra note 1, at 1.   
 5 O-M Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1 (citing 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1465 (citing Wright 
v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998))). 
 6 These standards, as stated in the Memorandum, are:  
whether (1) the arbitration proceedings were fair and regular; (2) all parties agreed to be bound; (3) 
the Arbitrator “considered” the unfair labor practice issue in that the contractual issue is “factually 
parallel” to the unfair labor practice issue and the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts 
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requesting the submission to the Division of Advice “all cases in which a 
Region recommends that the General Counsel reject deference.”7 
The General Counsel should be commended for this reconsideration of 
the Board’s standards for deferring to arbitration in the light of evolving 
judicial standards for the waiver of statutory rights through arbitration.  As I 
argued almost thirty years ago,8 based in part on Chairman Murphy’s     
determinative decision in General American Transportation,9 any Board 
deferral of statutory claims to the arbitration process entails an at least par-
tial compromise of the protection of statutory rights and thus should be 
conditioned on the union having legitimately waived that protection 
through acceptance of arbitration.10  The Board, I argued, thus should not 
defer to arbitration the protection of any substantive statutory right that 
could not be waived by an exclusive bargaining agent under the reasoning 
of the Court’s decision in NLRB v. Magnavox Co.11  The current reconside-
                                                                                                                           
relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice charge and (4) the resulting decision is not “clearly 
repugnant” to the Act.  
O-M Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1 n.1 (citing Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 573-74 (1984) (citing 
and clarifying Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955))). 
 7 O-M Memorandum, supra note 1, at 2. 
 8 See Michael C. Harper, Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under the NLRA: Part II, A Fresh 
Approach to Board Deferral to Arbitration, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 680 (1981). 
 9 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 810 (1977).  In General American Transportation, based on Chairman 
Murphy’s swing-vote opinion, the Board decided it would no longer require the use of unused, but 
available arbitration processes in cases charging violations of §§ 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(1)(A), and 8(b)(2) 
of the NLRA.  Id. at 812-13.  Chairman Murphy argued these sections protect the non-waivable § 7 
rights of individual employees.  Id.  She stated that deferral to future arbitration should be confined to 
charges of violations of §§ 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3), which Chairman Murphy asserted involve disputes 
between unions and employers about the meaning of collective agreements.  Id. at 810-11.  Chairman 
Murphy did not apply her distinction to Board deference to completed arbitration processes, id. at 813, 
the subject of the O-M Memorandum, and the Board never applied the distinction to post-arbitration 
deference in later cases. 
 10 See Harper, supra note 8, at 684-87.  Unlike Chairman Murphy, see supra note 9, I argued that 
the distinction between § 7 rights legitimately waived by a collective representative and those not so 
waived should be applied to Board doctrine on post-arbitration deference as well as to Board doctrine on 
pre-arbitration deferral.  See Harper, supra note 8, at 687-90.  I also explained why Chairman Murphy’s 
distinction between types of unfair labor practice charges did not fully track the distinction between § 7 
rights subject to union waiver and those outside the authority of unions.  See id. at 690-91. 
 11 415 U.S. 322, 324-25 (1974) (holding that company rule against distribution of literature on 
company property, including non-work areas, denied § 7 rights if enforced against distributions in sup-
port of, as well as against the union representative, despite possible authorization of rule in collective 
bargaining agreement).  The Court in Magnavox distinguished § 7 “rights in the economic area”, such as 
the right to strike to obtain better terms and conditions of employment, which can be waived “during the 
time of the agreement as [a] quid pro quo” for employer concessions, from the “rights of the employees 
to exercise their choice of a bargaining representative . . . to have no bargaining representative, or to 
retain the present one, or to obtain a new one,” where “a different rule” regarding waiver should obtain.  
415 U.S. at 325-26.  In the first part of my article on the implications of the Magnavox decision, Mi-
chael C. Harper, Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under the NLRA: Part I, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 335 
(1981), I elaborated a comprehensive definition of the latter set of rights to include rights:  
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ration of the relevance of waiver offers the promise of reopening the path 
for setting limits on deferral marked by Chairman Murphy, but foreclosed 
by the hardening of Board deferral doctrine for post-arbitration deference in 
Olin Corp.12 and for pre-arbitration deferral in United Technologies Corp.13 
The General Counsel’s reconsideration of the Board’s deference   
standards in light of Penn Plaza and the District of Columbia Circuit deci-
sions, however, also poses the risk that the Board may attempt to respond to 
both by merging the Penn Plaza standard for union waiver of a represented    
employee’s procedural right to a judicial forum to assert a statutory claim 
with a standard for union waiver of represented employees’ substantive 
statutory rights.  Such a merger, if it failed to distinguish between waivable 
and non-waivable substantive § 7 rights, could result in a greater compro-
mise of employee statutory rights not under the authority of exclusive    
bargaining agents.  The General Counsel and the Board can avert such a 
compromise only by understanding both the appropriate limits that must be 
placed on the District of Columbia Circuit’s theory of implied waiver of 
substantive § 7 rights under the National Labor Relations Act14 (NLRA) and 
the limited relevance to the NLRA of the Penn Plaza Court’s treatment of 
union waiver of a procedural statutory right to a judicial private right of 
action.  Such understanding in turn could lead to a new formulation of 
Board doctrine on deferral to arbitration that not only is responsive to the 
District of Columbia Circuit decisions and consistent with Penn Plaza’s 
support of arbitration under collective agreements, but also achieves 
Chairman Murphy’s goal of providing full protection to § 7 rights not sub-
ject to union waiver.   
                                                                                                                           
to communicate with each other concerning the identity and strategies of their bargaining agent, to 
communicate with their employer concerning the identity of their bargaining agent, to associate 
with, lead or support a bargaining agent, to act to achieve employer recognition and acceptance of 
a bargaining agent, to act to obtain better terms and conditions of employment from sources out-
side a bargaining relationship, to assist individuals outside the protected employees’ bargaining 
unit, and to act to protect and rectify the denial of other non-waivable rights.   
See Harper, supra note 8, at 680 n.4. 
 12 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).  In Olin, the Board both confirmed its policy under Spielberg Mfg. 
Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955), to defer to arbitration awards when certain conditions are met and also 
restated what those conditions required.  268 N.L.R.B. at 573-74.  That restatement is set forth in the O-
M Memorandum.  See supra note 1. 
 13 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).  The Board’s decision in United Technologies expressly rejected 
Chairman Murphy’s insulation of charges under §§ 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) from pre-
arbitration deferral.  Id. at 559-60.  As noted in supra note 9, neither Chairman Murphy in General 
American Transportation or the Board in later cases, had proceeded further to apply the distinction in 
post-arbitration deference cases, the subject of the O-M Memorandum. 
 14 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
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This essay provides such a new formulation.  Part II of the essay     
explains the theory of implied union waiver of substantive § 7 rights in   
favor of contractual rights as advanced by the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court of Appeals under the leadership of Judge Harry Edwards.15  This Part 
also articulates a reformulation of Board deferral doctrine for waivable sub-
stantive § 7 rights.16  Since this reformulation is based on placing appropri-
ate limits on Judge Edwards’s theory, it somewhat modifies the tests he sets 
forth in the decisions cited in the O-M Memorandum.  Part III explains the 
Penn Plaza decision and its relevance to Board deferral to arbitration in 
cases involving § 7 rights that are not subject to waiver by exclusive bar-
gaining agents.17  Part III also explains why the Board, as an executive 
agency serving a public function, while not required to set aside its        
processes for a private arbitration process chosen by either a union or the 
employees it represents, nonetheless might draw on the process even in the 
discharge of its responsibility to protect those § 7 rights that are not subject 
to the authority of exclusive bargaining representatives.18  
II.  THE WAIVER OF SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS THROUGH ARBITRATION 
A. Judge Edwards’s Waiver Theory 
A few years after my own elaboration of Chairman Murphy’s treat-
ment of Board deferral to arbitration as an acceptance of union waiver of 
employee rights, Judge Harry Edwards of the District of Columbia Circuit 
developed in a law review article his own waiver-based theory of why the 
Board not only may, but also must, defer the resolution of most unfair labor 
practice charges to the resolution of parallel contractual claims in the arbi-
tration process.19  Judge Edwards argued that a collective bargaining agree-
ment, at least when it includes an agreement to arbitrate disputes, defines 
the reach of many, if not most, § 7 rights of represented employees during 
the term of the agreement:  
I believe that when the parties negotiate a collective bargaining 
agreement and stipulate that they will arbitrate disputes arising under 
it, they have waived many of their statutory rights under the NLRA.  
                                                                                                                           
 15 See infra text accompanying notes 19-61. 
 16 See infra text accompanying notes 62-92. 
 17 See infra text accompanying notes 93-113. 
 18 See infra text accompanying notes 114-128. 
 19 See Harry T. Edwards, Deferral to Arbitration and Waiver of the Duty to Bargain: A Possible 
Way Out of Everlasting Confusion at the NLRB, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 23 (1985). 
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The parties’ agreement, in essence, supplants the statute as the source 
of many employee rights in the context of collective bargaining.20 
The parties’ commitment of the interpretation of the meaning of an 
agreement to arbitration thus is a delegation of the protection of the rights 
subject to the control of the union as the representative of the employees.  
For Judge Edwards, the Board has no authority to reject a negotiated arbi-
tration process as the means to define and protect waivable employee rights.  
Judge Edwards concludes that the Board must accept the results of any  
negotiated arbitration process unless the contract provision as interpreted 
sacrifices some non-waivable right of employees, including the right to fair 
representation, or is otherwise “illegal.”21  
Note that Judge Edwards’s theory has two premises: first, that a union 
has the authority to delegate the protection of the § 7 rights it controls to an 
arbitration process; and second, that a union does so whenever it negotiates 
a collective bargaining agreement that establishes an arbitration process.  
The first premise is not problematic.  Assuming that a union has authority to 
waive the substance of a particular § 7 right, such as the right to strike or 
the right to negotiate over a particular topic during the term of an agree-
ment, the union should be able to subject the right to any substantive or 
procedural qualification effected by arbitration.  Inasmuch as arbitration is a 
continuation of the collective bargaining process, any such qualification is 
no more than an acceptable partial waiver of a right that could be totally 
bargained away.   
The second premise of Judge Edwards’s theory is more open to chal-
lenge, however.  Such a challenge might seem to be supported by the 
Court’s clear pronouncement in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB,22 less 
than two years before the publication of Judge Edwards’s article, that it 
would “not infer from a general contractual provision that the parties     
intended to waive a statutorily protected right unless the undertaking is   
‘explicitly stated.’”23  More succinctly, the waiver must be “clear and     
unmistakable.”24  The negotiation of an arbitration clause in itself does not 
seem to be a “clear and unmistakable” waiver of a substantive right. 
Judge Edwards’s theory nonetheless may be consistent with           
Metropolitan Edison and the requirement that any waiver of a statutory 
right be clear and unmistakable.  The negotiation of an arbitration process 
in a collective bargaining agreement generally is a clear and unmistakable 
                                                                                                                           
 20 Id. at 28. 
 21 Id. at 31. 
 22 460 U.S. 693 (1983). 
 23 Id. at 708. 
 24 Id. 
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statement that the agreement is to be definitively interpreted through that 
process.  If the process then offers a clear and unmistakable interpretation 
that qualifies a substantively waivable statutory right, the Metropolitan   
Edison standard can be met, even if the agreement itself would not be read 
by the Board or a court to express a clear and unmistakable waiver.   
In Metropolitan Edison itself, the Court rejected the employer’s argu-
ment that the bargaining representative, by negotiating a new collective 
agreement without changing a general no-strike clause as interpreted in two 
prior arbitration decisions, had waived union officials’ waivable statutory 
right not “to take affirmative steps to end unlawful work stoppages.”25  The 
Court stated that “inconsistent, sporadic, or ambiguous” past arbitration 
decisions do not provide a clear waiver.26  The Court also suggested, how-
ever, that a past arbitration that “itself clearly and unmistakably imposes an 
explicit duty on union officials to end work stoppages” could do so.27  This 
suggestion seems to confirm that a decision rendered in the arbitration pro-
cess, as the continuation of collective bargaining, can qualify a waivable 
statutory right, regardless of whether the collective agreement itself would 
be read by the Board or by a court to express a clear and unmistakable 
waiver.  As stated by Judge Edwards’s article, Metropolitan Edison “can be 
read as endorsing the view that where the parties provide for final and   
binding arbitration of their disputes, the arbitrator’s decision becomes part 
of the written contract, and that contract, as construed by the arbitrator, can 
waive rights otherwise provided by the statute.”28  
Under Judge Edwards’s theory, what should be required for an arbitra-
tion process to be a clear and unmistakable waiver of a statutory right? Met-
                                                                                                                           
 25 Id. at 707.  The Court’s determination that the statutory right affected in Metropolitan Edison 
was substantively waivable by the collective representative, in my view, was in tension with the Court’s 
prior decision in NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974), to insulate from union waiver the § 7 
right to solicit other employees in support of a collective representative.  The Magnavox Court found the 
latter right not to be waivable because it concerns the employees’ choice of collective bargaining repre-
sentative, rather than the “economic” right to use concerted action to extract better terms and conditions 
from the employer.  415 U.S. at 325; see also supra note 11.  The § 7 right penalized by imposing a duty 
on union officials to take affirmative steps to end an unlawful strike also concerns the employees’ choice 
of collective bargaining representative, however, because penalizing union officials for doing no more 
than other employees penalizes the right to choose to be a union official and thereby discourages at least 
particular kinds of union leaders.  The Court in Metropolitan Edison, however, viewed a union’s agree-
ment to impose special strike control duties on their own officials as “more closely related to the eco-
nomic decision a union makes when it waives its members’ right to strike.”  460 U.S. at 706; see also 
Local 900, Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(interpreting Metropolitan Edison to uphold “discriminatory measures as necessary for the enforcement 
of the unions’ lawful waivers of the economic right to strike”). 
 26 460 U.S. at 709. 
 27 Id. at 709 n.13. 
 28 Edwards, supra note 19, at 38. 
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ropolitan Edison was a review of a Board unfair labor practice finding, not 
a review of a Board decision to defer or not to defer to an arbitration award 
in the particular case.  The Court considered past arbitration decisions only 
in light of the employer’s argument about the meaning of a subsequent bar-
gaining agreement.  If an arbitrator had found in the particular case that the 
general no-strike clause in the collective agreement imposed an affirmative 
duty on union officials to avoid strikes in breach of that clause, however, 
under Judge Edwards’s theory that finding would be a clear and unmistaka-
ble waiver.  It would be clear and unmistakable, moreover, regardless of the 
ambiguity of the contractual language and of other evidence of an agree-
ment to waive the union officials’ § 7 rights on which the arbitrator rested.  
The meaning of the arbitrator’s decision has to be clear, not the underlying 
basis for the decision.29 
The two District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals decisions cited 
in the O-M Memorandum,30 both authored by Judge Edwards, underscore 
that his theory requires only that the result of the arbitration process, not the 
collective bargaining agreement itself, be clear to the Board.  In neither case 
did Judge Edwards examine the underlying collective agreement to deter-
mine whether there had been a clear and unmistakable waiver of the § 7 
right on which the unfair labor practice charge was based.  The opinion in 
each case considered only whether a pre-arbitration settlement agreement, 
reached between the union and employer in accordance with fair and regu-
lar processes established by the collective agreement, had effectively 
waived any statutory rights, not whether the underlying collective agree-
ments had clearly done so.  Furthermore, in each case Judge Edwards    
assumed, even in the absence of any language concerning statutory rights in 
the settlement agreement, that the settlement of a contractual grievance 
against a termination without cause also had waived, or at least merged into 
the contractual right, any § 7 right affected by the termination.   
                                                                                                                           
 29 Judge Edwards indeed relied in his article on a panel decision involving an employer’s     
enhanced discipline of a union official for participating in waivable protected action.  See Fournelle v. 
NLRB, 670 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  In Fournelle, Judge Edwards had held that the Board in deter-
mining whether the union had waived the official’s statutory protection had to defer to an arbitrator’s 
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement in resolving an earlier grievance.  Id. at 338.  In his 
article, Judge Edwards distinguished the Court’s subsequent decision in Metropolitan Edison by stress-
ing that in Fournelle, unlike in Metropolitan Edison, the prior arbitration award had “explicitly”    
imposed extra duties on union officials to avoid unlawful work stoppages and that there also was no 
ambiguity about the relevance of the award to future disciplinary actions.  See Edwards, supra note 19, 
at 38.  In his article Judge Edwards, in my view justifiably, also criticized a Board decision, John Mor-
rell & Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 1 (1984), that had interpreted Metropolitan Edison to require that there “be 
explicit language in the contract itself (as opposed to an arbitrator’s explicit construction of the contract) 
to support a waiver.”  Edwards, supra note 19, at 39. 
 30 See supra note 4.   
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In the first case, Plumbers and Pipefitters Local Union No. 529 v. 
NLRB,31 Judge Edwards elaborated on how his waiver theory should be 
applied to require Board deference to the arbitration process.  In this case, 
the court upheld the Board’s deference to a settlement of a grievance filed 
by an   employee who had been discharged for following the instructions of 
a   union business manager to advise other employees to ignore a foreman’s 
shift assignment instructions as a protest of the loss of bargaining unit 
work.32  Judge Edwards held the Board had reasonably applied its own 
standards for deferring to arbitration settlements, which generally track the 
Spielberg/Olin standards for giving deference to arbitration decisions,    
including a requirement that the decision not be “palpably wrong.”33  He 
also asserted, however, that since the statutory right “implicated” in the 
grievance, the right to take concerted action in protest of an employer’s 
decision regarding work, was “waivable,” “it is unclear why the Board 
would ever have any choice but to give deference, at least so long as the 
grievance procedures through which the settlement is reached are fair and 
regular and the union has not breached its duty of fair representation.”34  
Judge Edwards assumed that the settlement of the grievance charging unfair 
treatment by the employer, as a fair and regular outcome of an established 
arbitration process, constituted a clear statement of the extent to which the 
union authorized the employer to control the grievant, including in his exer-
cise of the waivable § 7 right to induce an economic strike.  Such a state-
ment, in Judge Edwards’s view, cannot be a “palpably wrong”35 application 
of statutory law because it itself expresses the union’s agreement to qualify 
an employee right within its authority.36 
                                                                                                                           
 31 955 F.2d 744 (1992). 
 32 Id. at 747, 755. 
 33 See supra note 6.  The “palpably wrong” standard was adopted in NLRB v. Olin Corp. 268 
N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1985), as an explanation of the meaning of the “clearly repugnant to the Act”      
standard enunciated in Spielberg.  As Judge Edwards noted in Plumbers and Pipefitters, the Board in 
Alpha Beta Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1546 (1985), and U.S. Postal Service, 300 N.L.R.B. 196 (1990), adapted 
the Spielberg/Olin standards for deference to settlement agreements.  See 955 F.2d at 749-50. 
 34 955 F.2d at 756. 
 35 As Judge Edwards noted in Plumbers and Pipefitters, in Alpha Beta and U.S. Postal Service the 
Board stated that a settlement will not be deemed “palpably wrong” if it was arrived at through a process 
in which both sides made concessions.  Id.; see also supra note 33.  It is difficult to understand the 
relevance of concessions to the suitability of deference to the arbitration process, however.  This factor 
certainly “makes no sense if the underlying theory of the Board’s deference policy is the contractual 
waiver doctrine. . . .”  955 F.2d at 756. 
 36 The second District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals case cited in the O-M Memorandum, 
Titanium Metals Corp. v. NLRB, 392 F.3d 439 (D.C. Cir. 2004), also involved the question of whether 
the Board should defer to a settlement agreement in the arbitration process.  In Titanium Metals, unlike 
in Plumbers and Pipefitters, the Board had refused to defer to the settlement because it was not con-
vinced that the agreement was “fair and regular.”  See id. at 448.  Judge Edwards concluded that the 
Board abused its discretion in declining to defer to the settlement, which provided that the grievant “was 
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Judge Edwards’s waiver theory thus comfortably fits deference to a 
settlement of a grievance in the arbitration process, as a settlement between 
a bargaining representative and an employer can always be treated as a 
modification of the collective agreement.   
His waiver theory also fits deference to a completed arbitration award, 
however, as such an award also can be viewed as a modification of the 
agreement by construction or by the filling of gaps in the agreement’s 
meaning through the parties’ chosen process.  As stated by Judge Edwards, 
the “arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract is, in essence, part of the   
contract.”37  
Consider, for instance, the arbitration decision to which the Board 
gave deference in Olin Corp.38  The grievant in Olin, like the discharged 
union president in Metropolitan Edison, was terminated, at least in part, for 
failing to prevent a work action in breach of a no-strike clause in a collec-
tive agreement.39  The arbitrator concluded that the grievant’s “participation 
in the strike action was inconsistent with his manifest contractual obligation 
to attempt to stem the tide of unprotected activity.”40  This construction of 
the collective agreement defines the obligations of union officer-employees 
and the discretion of the employer to discipline for breach of those obliga-
tions.  The arbitration award thereby clearly and unmistakably completes an 
agreement to waive § 7 rights of union officers that the Court in             
Metropolitan Edison held to be subject to the control of a bargaining repre-
sentative,41 a bargaining representative like the one in Olin that agreed to 
delegate its control to an arbitration process.  The arbitration award in Olin, 
in other words, like the settlement agreement in Plumbers and Pipefitters, 
defines relevant § 7 rights.   
Judge Edwards’s waiver theory also provides a rationale for the 
Board’s policy of deferring decisions on some unfair labor practice charges 
to the completion of arbitration processes under certain conditions.  These 
conditions, as first pronounced by the Board in Collyer Insulated Wire42 and 
                                                                                                                           
not discharged for engaging in protected concerted activities under the NLRA,” id. at 444, but he did not 
further elaborate his waiver theory.  Judge Edwards did posit waiver as a basis for Board deferral in the 
case, however.  He asserted that the § 7 right claimed by the employee grievant, the right to distribute a 
newsletter critical of the employer’s labor policies to fellow employees, was waivable, and then con-
cluded that the Board had no basis for questioning the fairness and regularity of the arbitration process 
and a grievance settlement.  Id. at 447-50.  For further discussion of Titanium Metals, see infra text 
accompanying notes 73-84. 
 37 See Edwards, supra note 19, at 31. 
 38 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).  
 39 Id. at 573. 
 40 Id. 
 41 In my view, wrongly.  See supra note 25. 
 42 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). 
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as confirmed in United Technologies Corp.,43 include “a long and produc-
tive collective bargaining relationship,” “no claim of employer animosity to 
the employees’ exercise of protected rights,” a broad arbitration clause   
encompassing the dispute, the employer’s asserted “willingness” to arbi-
trate, and the dispute being “eminently well suited to resolution by arbitra-
tion.”44  The O-M Memorandum did not reference this policy; it mentioned 
only the Board’s policy of deference to completed arbitration awards.  If 
Judge Edwards’s waiver theory is accepted for post-arbitration deference, 
however, it also should be accepted as a basis for the Board’s deferring the 
consideration of unfair labor practice charges based on waivable statutory 
rights when conditions similar to those set forth in Collyer and United 
Technologies are met.  If a collective agreement could effectively waive or 
otherwise define a statutory right upon which a charge is based and if the 
parties have designated an arbitration process to determine the meaning of 
that agreement, then the Board should attempt to utilize the process when 
the employer is willing to cooperate in doing so. 
In his article on Board deferral, Judge Edwards indicated that the 
Board should avoid unnecessary interpretations of collective agreements, at 
least when considering § 8(a)(5) charges, by treating an arbitration clause as 
itself “a waiver of the duty to bargain,” or, in other words, as a statement 
that the arbitrator should define the extent to which the parties have a duty 
to bargain during the term of an agreement.45  Judge Edwards’s argument is 
particularly applicable to the issue in the cases his article discussed to illus-
trate the Board’s difficulty interpreting collective agreements, the Board’s 
two inconsistent decisions in the 1980s Milwaukee Spring controversy.46  
The issue in these cases was whether the employer was constrained by 
clauses in a collective agreement from transferring assembly operations, 
even after bargaining to impasse, from the facility covered by the agree-
ment to another facility that was not organized.  If the clauses in the collec-
tive agreement implicitly created a duty not to transfer the work, the       
employer’s doing so would have violated its duty, enforced through § 
8(a)(5) and defined in § 8(d) of the Act,47 not to modify “terms and condi-
                                                                                                                           
 43 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).  The Board in United Technologies, rejecting Chairman Murphy’s 
opinion in General American Transportation, see supra text accompanying note 9, also clarified that it 
would defer to the arbitration process under the Collyer conditions in complaints under §§ 8(a)(1), 
8(a)(3), 8(b)(1)(A), and 8(b)(2), as well as §§ 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3).  See id. at 560. 
 44 Id. at 558 (citing Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 837). 
 45 See Edwards, supra note 19, at 34-35. 
 46 Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co. (Milwaukee Spring II), 268 N.L.R.B. 601 
(1984); Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co. (Milwaukee Spring I), 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982).  
 47 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006). 
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tions contained in” the agreement during its term.48  If the clauses were not 
relevant to the work transfer, the employer did not commit an unfair labor 
practice.49  Thus, the union’s claim that the employer had committed a § 
8(a)(5) violation was based on the employer being constrained by contract 
clauses, the meaning of which could have been settled through arbitration.  
An arbitration process would define the extent of the statutory right.  Had 
the union had “access to arbitration,” which Judge Edwards assumed it did 
not,50 the waiver theory thus would have required the Board to defer its con-
sideration of the statutory charge until the arbitrator had interpreted the 
agreement.   
The waiver theory also indicates the Board generally should defer until 
the completion of an available arbitration process deciding the more usual § 
8(a)(5) charge of a refusal to bargain during the term of the agreement.  
This charge, which Judge Edwards did not distinguish in his analysis,     
alleges that the employer failed to bargain to impasse before effecting a 
change in a term or condition of employment subject to mandatory bargain-
ing.  The contract becomes relevant not, as in Milwaukee Spring, as the 
basis for the union’s charge, but rather as the basis for the employer’s     
defense, which claims that the union has accepted management’s right to 
have discretion over the term or condition during the term of the agreement.  
This acceptance would constitute a waiver of the § 7 right, protected 
through § 8(a)(5), “to engage . . . in collective bargaining,”51 a right clearly 
under the control of the exclusive bargaining representative.   
Consider, for instance, the issue in Collyer Insulated Wire.52  The com-
plaint in that case alleged that the employer violated § 8(a)(5) by making 
unilateral changes in certain wages and work assignments within the bar-
gaining unit.53  The employer contended “that its authority to make those 
changes was sanctioned by the collective-bargaining contract between the 
parties and their course of dealing under that contract.”54  The employer 
relied on a provision in the contract that bound it not to change “the general 
scale of pay,” but also seemed to authorize “adjustments in individual rates 
from time to time to remove inequalities or for other proper reasons.”55  The 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Id.  This was the interpretation given the agreement by the Board in Milwaukee Spring I.  See 
265 N.L.R.B. at 208.   
 49 This was the interpretation given the agreement by the Board in Milwaukee Spring II.  See 268 
N.L.R.B. at 602. 
 50 See Edwards, supra note 19, at 34. 
 51 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). 
 52 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). 
 53 Id. at 837. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 838-39. 
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employer also relied on negotiating history56 and on a provision allowing 
the union to challenge through a grievance and arbitration process the     
employer’s pay rates for new or changed jobs and on the contract’s         
generally broad “grievance and arbitration machinery.”57  Given the com-
prehensive terms of the contract and the negotiating history described in the 
Board’s decision, it was highly likely that any decision rendered through 
that machinery would determine whether the union in fact had “sanctioned” 
the employer’s changes in wages and working conditions, in other words 
whether it had waived the right to bargain over these changes during the 
term of the agreement.  A decision that found the agreement not to restrict 
the employer’s discretion to make the challenged changes, would find the 
agreement to authorize the discretion.  A decision finding no contractual 
violation thus would mean there was no statutory violation.   
The waiver theory also supports Board deferring, until the completion 
of arbitration processes meeting the Collyer/United Technologies condi-
tions, decisions on complaints based on waivable § 7 rights other than those 
to engage in collective bargaining.  As is true for § 8(a)(5) complaints, this 
is most clear for the limited number of other complaints that directly de-
pend on a provision in a collective agreement.  Consider, for instance, a § 
8(a)(1) complaint, like that supported by the Court’s decision in NLRB v. 
City Disposal Systems, Inc.,58 that an employer has disciplined an individual 
employee for invoking a clause in a collective agreement.  The Court in 
City Disposal approved as within the Board’s discretion its treatment of an 
individual’s assertion of a right based in a collective agreement as        
“concerted” within the meaning of § 7.59  Citing Collyer as well as Spiel-
berg, however, the Court also noted that the Board might defer to a     
“grievance process” the resolution of whether such concerted activity was 
also protected from employer retaliation.60  Such deferral of a right’s protec-
tion to a process sanctioned by the union in the collective agreement to de-
fine the agreement’s meaning is consistent with the right’s dependence upon 
the union’s concerted, collective action in the creation of the agreement.  
Thus, just as the union’s negotiation of a contractual right in City Disposal 
not to drive unsafe vehicles61 makes the invocation of that right by an indi-
vidual employee concerted and therefore protected, the union accepts quali-
                                                                                                                           
 56 Id. at 837-38. 
 57 Id. at 839. 
 58 465 U.S. 822, 824-25 (1984). 
 59 Id. at 837. 
 60 Id. at 838-39 (citing Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. 837; Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 
(1955)). 
 61 465 U.S. at 839. 
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fication of that protection by providing for the right to be defined through a 
grievance and arbitration process.   
Judge Edwards’s waiver theory, moreover, supports the deferral to the 
completion of an arbitration process of waivable rights of individual      
employees that would be secured by § 7 in the absence of any collective 
agreement.  Consider, for instance, a case in which not just one, but two 
employees, together refuse to drive vehicles that they consider unsafe.  The 
concerted nature of their refusal is not dependent upon their invocation of 
any collective agreement because they are acting together as well as for 
their mutual protection.  The employees’ statutory rights to engage in con-
certed action to obtain better, including safer, conditions of employment 
from their employer, however, are within the control of their exclusive bar-
gaining representative.  The exclusive representative’s negotiation of a col-
lective agreement both defining the employer’s discretion to control and 
discipline employees and also establishing an arbitration process to define 
the extent of that discretion thus supports the Board at least waiting for the 
completion of that process before deciding whether any rights have been 
abridged.  The waiver theory is as applicable to the Board’s pre-arbitration 
deferral of waivable statutory rights as it is to the Board’s deference to 
completed arbitration decisions and settlements. 
B. A Recommended Response for the Board 
As recognized by the O-M Memorandum at least for Board deference 
to completed arbitration decisions, the Board should reconsider its deferral 
doctrine in the light of Judge Edwards’s waiver theory.  Since the grievance 
arbitration process is a continuation of collective bargaining, grievance   
settlements and arbitration decisions should be considered to be part of an 
exclusive bargaining agent’s agreement with the employer.  When the 
Board reads such settlements or decisions to clearly and unmistakably 
waive or otherwise qualify statutory rights within the control of the exclu-
sive representative, it usually should accept such a waiver or qualification.  
This acceptance should not be dependent upon the arbitration decision or 
the settlement agreement being based on the same analysis of the meaning 
of the extant collective agreement that the Board would apply under its own 
“clear and unmistakable” waiver analysis.  An arbitration decision or     
settlement agreement, like any other negotiated modification of an agree-
ment, cannot be palpably wrong or clearly repugnant to the Act merely   
because it is not clearly suggested by or even because it departs sharply 
from a prior agreement.  Indeed, the Board need not even demand an ex-
press or implicit acknowledgement in an arbitration decision or settlement 
agreement that there has been a waiver of a statutory right, as long as the 
decision or agreement clearly authorizes the employer’s restraint of a     
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waivable employee right, rather than merely finds no contractual limitation 
on such restraint.   
The Board also should invoke the waiver theory to support its pre-
arbitration deferral policy under the Collyer/United Technologies condi-
tions.  When the parties have access to a fair and functioning grievance 
arbitration process that they have established in part to define their rights 
and obligations, the Board should demand that this process be used when 
unfair labor practice complaints are based on waivable statutory rights.  
Doing so encourages arbitration as a peaceful and efficient means for    
resolving disputes in accord with the national labor policy, as the Board has 
stressed.62  Doing so, as the waiver theory highlights, also requires the par-
ties to accept their full agreement, which includes use of the arbitration 
process to define rights and obligations.   
The Board, nonetheless, should not fully embrace the waiver theory 
for Board deferral as developed in Judge Edwards’s opinions for panels of 
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.  These decisions reveal 
several flaws in the theory as articulated by Judge Edwards.  First, Judge 
Edwards at least implicitly compromises the important requirement, con-
firmed by the Court in Metropolitan Edison, that a union waiver of a statu-
tory right must be “clear and unmistakable.”  He does so by articulating a 
standard for Board deference requiring consideration only of whether the 
statutory right on which a claim was based was waivable and whether the 
grievance arbitration process was fair,63 but not whether the arbitration deci-
sion or settlement agreement actually found union authorization of a waiver 
or qualification of the right.   
Judge Edwards overtly rejects the “clear and unmistakable” standard 
in cases reviewing findings of employer unilateral changes in mandatory 
terms by asserting that where a topic is “covered by the collective bargain-
ing agreement, the union has exercised its bargaining right and the question 
of waiver is irrelevant.”64  Judge Edwards’s somewhat ironic rejection of 
“the question of waiver” in this context reflects his view that where a union 
negotiates in a collective agreement a limitation on employer authority on 
some topic, it necessarily forfeits any right to bargain further during the 
term of the agreement over the employer’s exercise of discretion on that 
topic.65  On topics covered by a collective agreement, there is thus in effect 
                                                                                                                           
 62 Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984); Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 843. 
 63 See Edwards, supra note 19, at 28-30. 
 64 NLRB v. U.S. Postal Serv., 8 F.3d 832, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Edwards, J.) (quoting Dep’t of 
Navy v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 962 F.2d 48, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Edwards, J.) (emphasis in origi-
nal)). 
 65 Judge Edwards asserts this follows from the proposition that “[u]nless the parties agree other-
wise, there is no continuous duty to bargain during the term of the agreement with respect to a matter 
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no difference for Judge Edwards between the question of whether an 
agreement authorizes the employer’s action and the question whether the 
agreement prohibits the action.  That which the agreement does not        
prohibit, it must authorize.   
In most cases, Judge Edwards’s elision of the distinction between the 
questions of contractual authorization and contractual prohibition is not 
problematic.  Collective bargaining agreements that prohibit certain kinds 
of subcontracting or work assignments or incentive pay usually would be 
read by arbitrators to authorize the employer to implement unilaterally other 
kinds of subcontracting or work assignments or incentive pay.  In most cas-
es, but certainly not in all cases.  In some cases, arbitrators, perhaps based 
on evidence of negotiating history, might find the intent to leave for future 
bargaining certain additional employer actions related to but not prohibited 
by the negotiated agreement.  In those cases the arbitrator could decide the 
agreement does not prohibit the employer unilaterally taking such actions 
without deciding the agreement authorizes the actions.  The arbitrator, in 
other words, could decide the contractual issue in favor of the employer 
without finding the union to have waived the statutory right of represented 
employees, as secured by § 8(a)(5), to bargain collectively. 
Before dismissing § 8(a)(5) unilateral change complaints based on the 
resolution of contractual grievances, the Board thus should be assured that 
those resolutions actually decided that the employer’s discretion to act uni-
laterally was authorized by the union, rather than only that the union failed 
to secure an agreement to prohibit the action.  While the collective agree-
ment itself need not clearly and unmistakably waive the § 7 right to bargain 
collectively, an arbitration decision, or grievance settlement agreement, at 
least must do so.  Furthermore, the Board should continue to consider as a 
condition of deferring consideration of a § 8(a)(5) unilateral change charge 
                                                                                                                           
covered by the contract.”  8 F.3d at 836.  Judge Edwards’s support for this proposition, however, does 
not support freeing an employer to take any unilateral action on topics covered by an agreement, unless 
the agreement actually prohibits the action.  Judge Edwards cites his own opinion, International Union, 
United Auto Workers v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985), upholding the Board’s second Milwaukee 
Spring decision, Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co. (Milwaukee Spring II), 268 N.L.R.B. 601 
(1984), and the Court of Appeals decision upholding the Board’s seminal decision on midterm bargain-
ing obligations, NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952), affirming Jacobs Manufacturing 
Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951).  U.S. Postal Serv., 8 F.3d at 836.  Jacobs Manufacturing confirms that an 
employer has no statutory duty to bargain over a union’s request to modify terms and conditions “con-
tained in” a collective agreement during the agreement’s term, see 196 F.2d at 683-84; it does not give 
any warrant to an employer modifying without bargaining terms related to a topic covered in the agree-
ment.  The United Auto Workers decision upheld what it considered to be a Board determination that a 
particular collective bargaining agreement authorized a relocation of work, see 765 F.2d at 177; it did 
not hold that an employer has no continuing duty to bargain before making any changes not prohibited 
by any extant agreement that covers a topic related to the changes. 
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to the completion of the grievance arbitration process, whether the charge is 
“eminently well suited to resolution by arbitration.”66  In some cases, this 
should include consideration of whether settlement of the issue of prohibi-
tion is likely to settle the statutory issue of authorization as well.67 
Similar considerations are relevant to Board deferral of unfair labor 
practice complaints against employer discipline allegedly imposed in     
response to an employee’s engagement in § 7 protected activity under the 
control of an exclusive representative.  In most cases, an arbitrator’s deci-
sion that an employer had just cause to take disciplinary action determines 
not only that the agreement does not prohibit the discipline, but also that the 
discipline is authorized by the agreement.  In some cases, however, an arbi-
tration award might conclude only that the agreement cannot be the source 
of any restraint on the employer’s discretion, without even considering the 
possibility of other sources, such as the NLRA.  An arbitration award, for 
instance, might find in the collective agreement no restraint on an          
employer’s discretion to discharge an employee for refusing to submit to a 
disciplinary interview in the absence of a union officer, without taking any 
position on whether such a restraint might be found in the Board doctrine 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 842 (1971).  See supra text accompanying notes 42-
44.  
 67 The Board also should continue to adhere to the “clear and unmistakable” waiver standard in 
evaluating employer contract-based defenses in § 8(a)(5) unilateral change cases in which deferral to an 
arbitration process is not sought or is otherwise inappropriate.  See, e.g., NLRB v. Provena Hosp., 350 
N.L.R.B. 808, 808 (2007).  Although the Board has discretion to interpret broad management rights 
clauses to clearly authorize actions not prohibited by the contract, cf. Chicago Tribune v. NLRB, 974 
F.2d 933, 934 (7th Cir. 1992) (questioning the application of a clear waiver standard to a broad man-
agement rights clause and interpreting the clause de novo), the Board should continue to resist full 
acquiescence to Judge Edwards’s alternative contract-coverage standard.  Full acquiescence to this 
standard would force the Board to dismiss any complaint charging a unilateral change on a matter   
covered by a collective agreement during the agreement’s term.  See NLRB v. U.S. Postal Serv., 8 F.3d 
832, 836-37 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also, e.g., Enloe Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 433 F.3d 834, 837-38 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (Silberman, J., relying on U.S. Postal Serv.); cf. Bath Marine Draftsmen’s Ass’n v. NLRB, 475 
F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 2007) (suggesting the Board can apply a contract-coverage standard if it chooses).  
Judge Edwards’s standard denies a union the discretion to bargain for contractual restraints on employer 
prerogatives on a topic without sacrificing its statutory right to prevent the employer from taking other 
unilateral action on the topic during the term of the agreement.  The Board appropriately can demand 
that an employer who wishes to obtain authorization to change terms and conditions of employment 
during the term of an agreement do so either through a management rights clause that expressly provides 
such authority or by bargaining for and invoking an arbitration process that allows it to attempt to secure 
confirmation of the authority from an arbitrator to whom the Board might appropriately defer.  Contrary 
to Judge Edwards’s assertion in his article on deferral, without such an arbitral confirmation, protecting 
the union’s status as collective representative provides good reason “why an arbitration clause [alone] 
should not be viewed as a waiver of the right to charge an unfair labor practice with respect to unilateral 
changes made during a contract term.”  See Edwards, supra note 19, at 33-34. 
2010] A New Board Policy on Deferral to Arbitration 701 
 
affirmed in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.68  Even settlement agreements, 
though presumably covering all sources of possible restraints on employer 
authority subject to the union’s control, might expressly cover only those 
restraints imposed by the contract.  Thus, the Board should not defer its 
decision on any charge of a deprivation of a waivable statutory right to a 
resolution of an arbitration process under a collective agreement without 
considering whether that resolution actually clearly and unmistakably found 
union authorization of the challenged action.69 
In addition to adding a condition requiring the arbitration resolution to 
have considered the statutory claim, the Board also should strengthen the 
minimal conditions listed in the decisions cited in the O-M Memorandum 
by Judge Edwards for accepting deference to the resolution of arbitration 
grievances under collective agreements. Those conditions are that       
grievance procedures be “fair and regular” and that “the union has not 
breached its duty of fair representation.”70  Judge Edwards imports the “fair 
and regular” condition from the Board’s current conditions for deferring to 
arbitration decisions and settlement agreements.  He presumably adds the 
“duty of fair representation” condition because the duty of fair representa-
tion is an obligation that is imposed on unions as an implied corollary to 
their status as exclusive representatives with authority to balance the inter-
ests and certain rights of represented employees.71 Judge Edwards          
recognizes that unions’ authority as exclusive representatives to waive or 
otherwise qualify statutory rights through the arbitration process must be 
conditioned on their doing so in accord with the minimal standards of fair-
ness imposed by the union’s duty of fair representation – that its balancing 
of employee interests not be “discriminatory, arbitrary or in bad faith.”72  
                                                                                                                           
 68 420 U.S. 251 (1975).  In my view, the § 7 right “to refuse to submit without union representa-
tion to an interview which [the employee] reasonably fears may result in his discipline,” 420 U.S. at 
256, is an economic right to take concerted action to achieve a better condition of employment and is 
thus subject to union control.  See Harper, supra note 11, at 357-60. 
 69 In his opinion in Plumbers and Pipefitters, Judge Edwards dismisses as factually inaccurate an 
argument that the union “specifically disclaimed any intention of resolving the statutory issue.”  Plumb-
ers & Pipefitters Local Union No. 520 v. NLRB, 955 F.2d 744, 755 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  The opinion does 
not state whether deference would have been inappropriate if the union had in fact so “disclaimed,” 
however.  
 70 Id. at 756. 
 71 See Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (confirming the duty exists for exclu-
sive bargaining agents under the NLRA); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 
(1944) (finding such a duty for exclusive bargaining agents under the Railway Labor Act). 
 72 The formal standard for breach of the duty of fair representation, whether in contract admin-
istration or negotiation, is “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.”  See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass’n 
Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).  For an explanation of 
this standard as requiring the same kind of principled decision making required of governments by the 
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Judge Edwards, however, does not acknowledge that the Board’s “fair and 
regular” condition can provide additional, reinforcing protection of this 
fairness beyond that provided by the necessarily vague and liberal general 
duty of fair representation standard cited above.  Such reinforcement, while 
not appropriate as a modification of the duty of fair representation general-
ly, seems a particularly appropriate condition for the indirect waiver of stat-
utory rights through a contractual arbitration process.   
Consider the more recent decision of the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court of Appeals cited in the O-M Memorandum, Titanium Metal Corp. v. 
NLRB.73  In this case, in an opinion by Judge Edwards, the court refused to 
accept the Board’s decision not to defer to a grievance settlement its deci-
sion on an unfair labor practice complaint that an employer had discharged 
an employee for publishing and distributing to other employees a newsletter 
that included articles critical of supervisors and the employer’s labor-
management policies.74  The grievance settlement explicitly concluded as a 
finding of fact that the grievant “was not discharged for engaging in pro-
tected concerted activities under the NLRA,” but rather for other conduct 
that would not be protected by § 7.75  The union’s agreement to this finding 
of fact, whether or not correct, was a clear and unmistakable waiver of any 
§ 7 right that the grievant had to publish and distribute the newsletter.     
Assuming any such right was under the control of the union,76 Judge      
Edwards correctly concluded that the Board was bound to give effect to the 
settlement agreement as a resolution of the statutory complaint – unless the 
settlement seemed to be an unfair union sacrifice of the interests of the 
grievant.  For Judge Edwards, the latter possibility could be easily dis-
missed because there was “no claim that the Union breached its duty of fair 
representation.”77 
The Board in Titanium, however, declined to defer because of its   
finding that the process resulting in the settlement agreement was not “fair 
and regular.”78  This finding was based on the settlement agreement provid-
ing different reasons for the discharge than those given the grievant at the 
time of the discharge, and on the union’s failure to disclose the agreement 
to the grievant when notifying him it would not take his grievance to arbi-
                                                                                                                           
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Michael C. Harper & Ira C. Lupu, Fair 
Representation as Equal Protection, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1985). 
 73 392 F.3d 439 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 74 Id. at 441-43. 
 75 Id. at 444. 
 76 See infra text accompanying note 92. 
 77 392 F.3d at 442. 
 78 Titanium Metals Corp., 340 N.L.R.B. 766, 767 (2003), enforced on other grounds, 392 F.3d 
439. 
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tration.79  The Board concluded that these factors suggested “an attempt to 
disguise the real reason for the discharge,” the grievant’s protected distribu-
tion of the newsletter to other employees.80  The Board’s decision did not 
speculate on why the union would have wanted to participate in such a 
masquerade, but one can imagine the grievant’s newsletter and criticisms 
making life more difficult for union as well as company officials.  Not sur-
prisingly, the Board did not conclude that the union had breached its duty of 
fair representation in accepting the settlement; it had insufficient infor-
mation to make such a charge against the union and the Board has never 
made such a conclusion important to a finding of sufficient irregularity to 
warrant a refusal to defer to an arbitration resolution.  Nevertheless, the 
Board made evident its uncertainty about the union’s good faith in settling 
the grievance, and thereby perhaps in waiving the grievant’s statutory pro-
tections. 
Judge Edwards dismissed the Board’s concerns about the different   
reasons for discharge given in the settlement and the failure to provide the 
settlement to the grievant by stressing that the employer and union had 
breached no formal legal obligation.81  He concluded that the Board could 
not refuse to defer on the “whim” of a suspicion.82  For him, apparently, the 
“fair and regular” standard provides a reason not to defer only if there was a 
clear departure from the processes set forth in the agreement or otherwise 
previously used by the parties.  The standard is not a means to ensure the 
union’s good faith in balancing the interests and rights of represented     
parties. 
In my view, the Board should use the “fair and regular” standard in 
part83 for this latter purpose, perhaps with a fuller explanation of the       
                                                                                                                           
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Titanium Metals, 392 F.3d at 449. 
 82 Id. 
 83 The Board also should continue to employ the “fair and regular” standard for the additional 
purpose of ensuring there has not been abuse of the arbitration processes to which deference is sought.  
The Board, for instance, might apply standards borrowed from the provisions in the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA) governing judicial review of arbitration awards.  9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006).  Pursuant to these 
provisions, courts may vacate arbitration awards: 
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evi-
dence of partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where arbitrators were 
guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refus-
ing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehavior by 
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their 
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject 
matter submitted was not made. 
Id. 
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particular importance of ensuring good faith, non-arbitrary, and non-
discriminatory union decision-making where statutory rights are at stake.  
The waiver theory is based on the authority of exclusive bargaining repre-
sentatives to waive certain substantive statutory rights that the Board also is 
vested with authority to protect.  The Board surely has discretion to exer-
cise its own authority to protect these rights when it has reason to suspect 
an exclusive bargaining representative is exercising its waiver authority in 
bad faith.  The Board in declining to defer to a union waiver should not 
have to have as definitive evidence of such bad faith as it would to find the 
union vulnerable to monetary damages84 because it has committed an unfair 
labor practice in breaching its duty of fair representation. 
Third, the Board should strengthen the distinction made in Judge    
Edwards’s waiver theory between Board deferral of complaints alleging the 
deprivation of waivable § 7 rights and those alleging the deprivation of non-
waivable rights.  That strengthening could follow the elaboration I gave 
almost thirty years ago to Chairman Murphy’s suggestion that the Board, 
based on the Court’s decision in NLRB v. Magnavox Co.,85 must limit the 
kinds of cases it defers to an uncompleted arbitration process.86  Judge    
Edwards recognizes that his waiver theory does not apply to those § 7 rights 
not under the control of exclusive bargaining representatives, but neither his 
opinions nor his article on deferral pays sufficient attention to the broad 
scope of the § 7 rights the Magnavox decision indicates cannot be compro-
mised by unions. 
In Magnavox, the Court affirmed a Board finding that an employer’s 
prohibition of the distribution of literature on company property could not 
be applied against the distribution during non-work time and in non-work 
areas of literature critical or supportive of the union representative, despite 
the apparent authorization of the rule in the collective agreement.87  The 
Court distinguished waivable “rights in the economic area,” such as the 
right to strike or take other economic action to extract better terms of em-
ployment from an employer, from non-waivable “rights of the employees to 
exercise their choice of a bargaining representative.”88  Over the dissent of 
                                                                                                                           
 84 See, e.g., Bowen v. U.S. Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 222 (1983) (holding that where an employ-
ee successfully sues employer for breach of agreement and union for breach of duty of fair representa-
tion, an allocation of damages between employer and unions is required); Int’l Bd. of Elec. Workers v. 
Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 50-52 (1979) (considering the threat of damage awards debilitating union treasuries 
in holding not to allow punitive damages for breach of duty of fair representation). 
 85 415 U.S. 322 (1974). 
 86 See Harper, supra note 8; see also Harper, supra note 11. 
 87 415 U.S. at 326. 
 88 Id. at 325. 
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three Justices,89 the Court in Magnavox insulated from union waiver the 
protection of communications between employees in support of the contin-
uation of the bargaining representative as well as communications against 
the representative.90  The former communications, like the latter, are about 
the employees’ choice of a representative; they are not, like a strike or col-
lective bargaining, a direct effort to extract terms from an employer.   
This distinction indicates a broader range of non-waivable § 7 rights 
than Judge Edwards seems to assume.  In his article on deferral, Judge    
Edwards asserts that Magnavox holds “a union may not waive the           
employees’ rights to choose a new bargaining representative, because on 
that particular issue the interests of the union and the workers diverge.”91  
Non-waivable § 7 rights, for Judge Edwards, thus are those “in which the 
union and employee interests are potentially adverse.”92  This position 
seems to more closely reflect that of the dissenters than that of the majority 
in Magnavox, and it may obscure the potential for the sacrifice of rights the 
majority’s position would protect from waiver.   
For instance, the newsletters that the grievant in Titanium Metals      
alleged he was discharged for distributing probably included, in addition to 
criticisms of the employer’s labor relations, at least implicit advocacy of 
steps the union should take in response.  Such advocacy would have consti-
tuted an attempt to redefine the nature of the employees’ collective repre-
sentative rather than a direct economic action to extract better conditions 
from the employer.  Thus, the grievant’s § 7 right to distribute the newslet-
ters would not have been a right fully “in the economic area” and waivable 
by the union.93  The Board therefore had another good reason not to defer to 
the union’s settlement of the grievance.   
Because Judge Edwards’s theory of substantive waiver through arbi-
tration is not applicable to non-waivable § 7 rights, the Board should not be 
required to defer to the arbitration process any complaint of an unfair labor 
practice that might threaten the exercise of the broad range of non-waivable 
§ 7 rights suggested by the Magnavox decision.  The General Counsel 
                                                                                                                           
 89 Id. at 327 (Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 90 Id. at 325-26 (majority opinion). 
 91 Edwards, supra note 19, at 30. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Indeed, a strong case can be made that the Board should posit a bright line rule insulating from 
union waiver the statutory protection of any communications between union-represented employees 
concerning terms and conditions of employment.  See Harper, supra note 11, at 354 n.85.  Most such 
communications implicitly advocate some response from the employees’ collective representative, and 
thus are about determining the nature of that representative.  For instance, the newsletters in Titanium 
Metals, unlike flyers distributed to customers, probably were not in themselves part of some extra-union 
effort to extract better terms and conditions of employment from the employer, but rather part of an 
attempt to convince fellow employees to pressure the union to take action.   
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should consider whether non-waivable rights might have been threatened in 
each case in which post-arbitration deference or pre-arbitration deferral is 
sought.  And, as explained in the next section, in the exercise of its adminis-
trative discretion, the Board should weigh heavily the nature of any such 
threat when considering the potential utility of arbitration. 
III.  THE COMMITMENT TO ARBITRATE 
                                 AS A WAIVER OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS 
The Board’s attention to the distinction between waivable and non-
waivable § 7 rights is particularly important in light of the Court’s decision 
in 14 Penn Plaza, LLC v. Pyett94 to approve the enforcement of agreements 
between employers and unions to submit to arbitration claims of represent-
ed employees based on substantively non-waivable statutory rights.  The 
timing of the O-M Memorandum a few months after the decision in Penn 
Plaza indeed suggests that this decision, more than Judge Edwards’s old 
Court of Appeals opinions, is the primary impetus for any reconsideration 
the General Counsel may give to the Board’s deferral doctrine.  
In Penn Plaza, the Court held enforceable a provision in a collective 
bargaining agreement that “clearly and unmistakably” assigned to arbitra-
tion a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).95  
The Court stressed the authority granted by the NLRA to exclusive bargain-
ing agents to negotiate for the arbitration of employment claims of repre-
sented employees, and it concluded this authority reaches any claim under a 
statute, like the ADEA, that does not preclude arbitration as a forum for the 
adjudication of claims.96  The ADEA’s allowance of the assignment of 
claims to the arbitration forum had already been confirmed by the Court in 
Gilmer v. Johnson/Lane Corp.,97 in which the Court upheld compelling an 
employee to arbitrate an ADEA claim based on his having acceded to his 
employer’s demand that the employee assign all of his employment claims 
to arbitration.98  Given Gilmer, the Penn Plaza holding seems easily deduc-
ible; if an employer unilaterally can require its employees to accept the   
                                                                                                                           
 94 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009). 
 95 129 S. Ct. at 1466; see also 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2006).  
 96 129 S. Ct. at 1466. 
 97 500 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1991). 
 98 Interstate/Johnson Lane required Gilmer as a condition of his employment to be registered as a 
securities representative with the New York Stock Exchange.  Id. at 23.  This registration in turn re-
quired him to agree to the arbitration of any dispute arising between him and his employer.  Id.  In 
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), the Court confirmed that Gilmer applies outside 
the context of third-party regulation to all employment contracts other than those exempted from cover-
age of the Federal Arbitration Act because the employees, like seamen or railroad workers, are directly 
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce.  See also 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).  
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employer’s arbitration system as a condition of employment, it is difficult 
to understand why an employer and a union cannot bilaterally require an 
employee represented by the union to accept a negotiated arbitration system 
as a condition of employment within the bargaining unit.99  A union-
negotiated system, moreover, usually can be expected to be at least as pro-
tective of an employee’s substantive rights as can a unilaterally imposed 
arbitration system.100 
The Court in Penn Plaza, however, does not authorize union waiver of 
the ADEA substantive right to be secure from age discrimination in       
employment, any more than the Court in Gilmer allowed individual waiver 
of this right.  The Penn Plaza Court notes that the ADEA includes a provi-
sion that prohibits the prospective waiver of “rights or claims that may arise 
after the date the waiver is executed,”101 and reasons that because the provi-
sion covers waiver by an individual, it must apply only to substantive rights 
and not to the procedural right of action at issue.102  Moreover, the opinion’s 
penultimate paragraph reaffirms that a “substantive waiver of federally pro-
                                                                                                                           
 99 This does not assume that unions should readily negotiate the assignment of all individual 
employees’ statutory claims to arbitration.  Unions may resist doing so because of the burdens of such 
an assignment on their limited treasuries and because of concerns about duty of fair representation 
claims brought against them by disappointed employees who did not obtain relief through arbitration.  
The Penn Plaza Court indeed stressed the union’s duty of fair representation as a corrective against any 
union conflict of interest in the arbitration process.  129 S. Ct. at 1473. 
Nonetheless, unions presumably should prefer that they, rather than individual employees, have 
control over the potential assignment of statutory claims to arbitration.  Were such assignments not a 
mandatory topic of bargaining, employers could devalue unions as representatives by imposing arbitra-
tion on represented employees without any bargaining.  See Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Nw. Airlines, 
Inc., 199 F.3d 477, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (employers can impose compulsory arbitration of statutory 
rights on union-represented employees under the assumption that such arbitration is not a mandatory 
topic for bargaining).  Under the Penn Plaza holding, in contrast, unions can decide whether to accept 
the arbitration of particular statutory rights in order to secure other more favorable terms and conditions 
of employment for the bargaining units they represent.  Although unions are obligated to bargain over 
the scope of arbitration jurisdiction, employers cannot unilaterally impose arbitration over topics the 
union does not accept, even after bargaining to impasse.  Cf. Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 
190, 208-09 (1991) (upholding Board doctrine that commitment to arbitration does not extend beyond 
expiration of agreement because arbitration is consensual) (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior 
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (federal labor policy is that “arbitration is a matter of 
contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so 
to submit”)).  Furthermore, unions should be able to protect themselves from exposure to duty of fair 
representation suits by allowing employees the right to press their own statutory claims through arbitra-
tion, an allowance that employers presumably would accept to ensure that employees not retain rights to 
invoke judicial jurisdiction.  See infra text accompanying note 105. 
 100 This condition of at least equal procedural protection through a union-negotiated system, how-
ever, may not always be met.  For instance, if only the union and employer, rather than individual em-
ployees, choose arbitrators, the arbitrators may be less likely to be sensitive to employee claims not 
pressed by the union.  See infra note 107. 
 101 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(C) (2006). 
 102 129 S. Ct. at 1465. 
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tected civil rights will not be upheld.”103  The opinion suggests that if the 
union blocked arbitration of the ADEA claims, and thus denied the alterna-
tive forum of arbitration, the union would be sacrificing a substantive anti-
discrimination right.  The Court, however, did not find adequate evidence in 
the record “to resolve in the first instance” whether the bargaining agree-
ment “allows the Union to prevent [employees] from ‘effectively vindicat-
ing’ their ‘federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum.’”104 
The Board must recognize the Penn Plaza Court’s distinction between 
substantive and procedural waiver in any reformulation of its deferral     
policy.  Judge Edwards’s theory postulates that an agreement to arbitrate 
effectively waives additional Board protection of those substantive § 7 
rights subject to the union’s control.  Under this theory the Board should 
respect an arbitration decision or grievance settlement even if it modifies or 
fully sacrifices a waivable substantive right, like the right to strike; but if 
the decision or settlement compromises a non-waivable right in any way, 
the theory is inapplicable.  Because the waiver accepted in Penn Plaza is 
only procedural, by contrast, it supports the assignment to an arbitration 
process of rights of action to secure non-waivable, as well as waivable, 
rights, but only to the extent that the process does not compromise the sub-
stantive rights.  As suggested in Penn Plaza, substantive waiver would   
occur if employees were prevented from “effectively vindicating” their 
statutory rights in an “arbitral forum.”  Presumably, any final union settle-
ment of an employee’s statutory claim that is not accepted by that employee 
would prevent vindication of the claim in an arbitral forum and thus would 
constitute an ineffective substantive waiver.105  Furthermore, even if a     
union, after itself declining the claim, permitted the employee to proceed 
independently to an arbitration hearing, the claim could effectively be sacri-
ficed.  This might be the case, for instance, if the employee had no role in 
choosing the arbitrator106 or if the employees’ costs of paying the arbitrator 
were prohibitive.107 
                                                                                                                           
 103 129 S. Ct. at 1474 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 637 (1985)).  
 104 Id. (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)). 
 105 Settlements like those in the two waiver decisions of Judge Edwards cited in the O-M Memo-
randum, Plumbers and Pipefitters, and Titanium Metals, see supra note 4, thus could not sacrifice an 
effective forum for the vindication of non-waivable substantive statutory rights like those protected by 
the ADEA or by the interpretation of § 7 of the NLRA given by the Court in Magnavox, see supra note 
11. 
 106 See, e.g., Hooters of Am. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-40 (4th Cir. 1999) (arbitration not 
enforceable because of employer’s egregiously unfair arbitration rules, including selection procedures 
ensuring control of membership of arbitration panel). 
 107 See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483-85 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Edwards, J.) 
(requiring employee to pay arbitrators’ fees could undermine substantive rights by creating barrier to 
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Even  more  importantly,  the  Board  also  must  recognize  that Penn 
Plaza, like the Gilmer decision on which it relied, concerned the assign-
ment to arbitration of a private right of action granted by the ADEA; the 
Penn Plaza decision did not grant unions authority to replace public admin-
istrative processes with a private arbitral process.  To the contrary, the Penn 
Plaza Court cited its earlier decision in Equal Employment Opportunity 
Comm. v. Waffle House, Inc.,108 which had held that an employee’s agree-
ment to arbitrate employment discrimination claims did not limit the 
EEOC’s authority to seek victim-specific relief for that employee in a judi-
cial action.  The Waffle House Court reserved whether a settlement or arbi-
tration judgment, through principles of res judicata or mootness, would 
affect the EEOC’s claim or remedy,109 but it confirmed the public agency’s 
“exclusive authority over the choice of forum and the prayer for relief once 
a charge has been filed.”110  This authority is necessary for the EEOC to 
“vindicate [the] public interest” it is charged with protecting.111 
The NLRA, of course, provides no private right of action for the pro-
tection of § 7 rights from unfair labor practices that could be waived in fa-
vor of arbitration.  The only processes it provides are the Board’s public 
administrative processes,112 which are to be utilized at the Board’s discre-
tion to protect the public interest in the free exercise of § 7 rights, not just to 
secure some form of restitution for employees denied such freedom.113  Just 
as an individual employee’s or his union’s arbitration of statutory employ-
ment discrimination claims cannot waive the EEOC’s statutory authority to 
address the same discrimination, neither can the employee’s or union’s arbi-
tration of a claim of denial of a right secured by § 7 of the NLRA waive the 
NLRB’s authority to address the same denial.  This is confirmed by § 10(a) 
of the NLRA, which provides that the Board’s power to “prevent . . . unfair 
labor practice[s] . . . shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment 
or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or 
otherwise.”114 
                                                                                                                           
assertion of claims).  But see Green Tree Fin. Corp., 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) (although large arbitration 
costs could preclude vindication of statutory right, party claiming such preclusion “bears the burden of 
showing the likelihood” of prohibitive costs). 
 108 534 U.S. 279, 295 (2002). 
 109 Id. at 296-97. 
 110 Id. at 298. 
 111 Id. at 296.  
 112 See 29 U.S.C § 160 (2006) (covering Board processes for the adjudication and enforcement of 
unfair labor practice complaints). 
 113 See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 192-93 (1941) (stating that the Board 
was not “devised” for the “limited function” of correction of private injuries). 
 114 29 U.S.C. § 160(a).  This provision does not preclude the Board’s deference to arbitration 
decisions and settlements that involve the qualification of waivable rights.  When considering deference 
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Nevertheless, the Court’s opinion in Penn Plaza indicates that the 
Board in appropriate cases could take into account arbitration decisions in 
its adjudication even of claims involving non-waivable rights.  The Penn 
Plaza Court emphatically retracted the “broad dicta” in its earlier decision, 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,115 “that was highly critical of the use of arbi-
tration for the vindication of statutory antidiscrimination rights.”116  That 
Gardner-Denver dicta, on which I117 relied in my attempt to define limits on 
Board deferral, contended that an arbitration process well-suited for the 
resolution of contractual claims could compromise statutory rights for nu-
merous reasons – including the arbitration process’s relative informality,118 
some arbitrators’ lack of legal expertise,119 and a union’s potential conflict 
of interest with individual represented employees.120  Taking a very different 
view of arbitration under collective agreements, the Penn Plaza Court treat-
ed such arbitration as comparable to the other forms of arbitration it had 
found capable of treating both “factual and legal complexities,” and thus an 
acceptable substitute for a judicial forum for private rights of action.121 
The Board, even in cases involving non-waivable rights, thus should 
have the discretion to find an arbitration process to have offered an        
acceptable substitute for its own administrative processes under certain 
conditions.  First, the Board must not accept an arbitrator’s incorrect appli-
cation or interpretation of the meaning of a non-waivable statutory right.  
The Board’s “palpably wrong” or “clearly repugnant” standards accept 
some degree of compromise of substantive law and thus are not appropriate 
for deferral to an arbitrator’s use of statutory law in cases involving non-
                                                                                                                           
in a case involving waivable rights, the Board can treat the arbitration decision or settlement as a modi-
fication of the substantive rights upon which the unfair labor practices are based, without compromising 
its processes for the prevention or remediation of such practices.  As explained in text, the Board, by 
contrast, cannot treat arbitration decisions or settlements involving unwaivable rights as substantive 
qualifications of those rights. 
 115 See generally 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
 116 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1469 (2009).  The Court in Gardner-Denver had held that a court should not 
preclude or defer ruling independently on an employee’s Title VII race discrimination suit because an 
arbitrator had ruled that the employee’s contested discharge was for just cause, even though the arbitra-
tor could have invoked a provision in the collective bargaining agreement barring race discrimination.  
415 U.S. at 59-60.  The Penn Plaza Court distinguished Gardner-Denver by stressing that the collective 
bargaining agreement in the earlier case did not cover statutory claims; the arbitrator in Gardner-Denver 
thus had the authority only to resolve the employee’s contractual claim of race discrimination, not his 
statutory claim of discrimination.  129 S. Ct. at 1467. 
 117 See Harper, supra note 8, at 686; see also United Tech. Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 563 (1984) 
(Zimmerman, Member, dissenting). 
 118 See 415 U.S. at 57-58. 
 119 Id. at 57. 
 120 Id. at 58 n.19. 
 121 129 S. Ct. at 1471-73. 
2010] A New Board Policy on Deferral to Arbitration 711 
 
waivable rights.122  In adjudicating a non-waivable statutory claim, the 
Board may cite the Penn Plaza decision to support acceptance of an arbitra-
tor’s factual findings or her interpretation of relevant contractual clauses, 
but it must decide any issue of statutory interpretation itself without defer-
ence. 
Second, the Board should not accept an arbitrator’s consideration of a 
factually parallel, but distinct, claim as an adequate substitute for resolution 
of a claim of deprivation of a non-waivable § 7 right.  Since the parties to a 
collective agreement can substitute a contractual right for a waivable statu-
tory right, the Board may defer its protection of such statutory rights to a 
collectively bargained arbitration process’s protection of factually parallel 
contractual claims.123  Where employees claim deprivation of non-waivable 
§ 7 rights, however, the Board should not accept the substitution of protec-
tion of contractual rights.  Neither Judge Edwards’s theory, which is limited 
to waivable statutory rights, nor Penn Plaza, which does not extend to    
acceptance of the compromise of a substantive right, supports such a substi-
tution.  
Third, the arbitration process must have resulted in a decision after an 
adjudication that the Board deems to have been full and fair.  Just as griev-
ance settlement negotiations are not a substitute for a judicial forum,124 they 
are not a substitute for Board adjudication.  Similarly, the Board must be 
convinced that the arbitration process has been fully and effectively utilized 
by the union or the employee before deferring the exercise of its public 
responsibilities even on the resolution of factual issues.125  The Board can 
sensibly claim that the preservation of scarce public resources justifies reli-
ance on alternative private processes for the resolution of factual disputes 
only when it can be confident that those private processes are fair and effec-
tive.  
Fourth, the Board must be convinced that the union as well as the arbi-
trator knew that the arbitration process could influence the Board’s protec-
tion of non-waivable § 7 rights.  This is necessary to assure that the parties 
and the arbitrator treated the arbitration process as a potential substitute for 
the Board’s public processes.  The assignment to arbitration of the protec-
                                                                                                                           
 122 Under Judge Edwards’s theory, these standards are unnecessary in cases where the parties have 
authority to compromise potentially relevant statutory rights, such as rights to engage in economic 
strikes.  See supra text accompanying notes 32-36. 
 123 See supra text accompanying notes 39-41. 
 124 See supra text accompanying note 105. 
 125 See supra text accompanying notes 106-07. 
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tion of such statutory rights thus must be “clear and unmistakable.”126  In 
contrast to its role in the implied waiver of § 7 rights under Judge          
Edwards’s theory,127 a broad arbitration clause that does not expressly cover 
all § 7-based grievances should not be the basis for the Board’s deferral to 
even the factual findings in a clear arbitration decision on claims of depri-
vation of non-waivable § 7 rights. 
All of these conditions also should be taken into account by the Board 
before deferring consideration of a claim of deprivation of non-waivable 
rights to an uncompleted arbitration process.  The Board should defer such 
a case only after determining that doing so is unlikely to compromise sub-
stantive rights and that the union has clearly and unmistakably agreed to 
have the case arbitrated.  The Board thus must be fully satisfied the Collyer-
United Technologies standards128 are met in all respects, including the arbi-
tration clause clearly covering the dispute and the dispute being well suited 
to arbitration.  Furthermore, since delay also can lead to a compromise of 
rights, the Board must be convinced that deferral to the arbitral process will 
more efficiently and quickly settle the case because the issues are primarily 
ones of fact rather than statutory interpretation.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Penn Plaza provides an appropriate 
impetus for the Board to reevaluate under a theory of union waiver the rele-
vance of arbitration to the Board’s adjudication of unfair labor practice 
charges.  That reevaluation must appreciate, however, that the Penn Plaza 
decision accepted arbitration only as an alternative to a judicial forum for a 
private right of action.  The decision did not warrant the waiver of public 
processes for protection of statutory rights129 or the waiver of particular 
underlying substantive rights.130  The decision’s analysis therefore did not 
provide direct support for and should not be merged with a waiver justifica-
tion for mandatory Board deferral to arbitration as Judge Edwards urged. 
The Board’s reevaluation of its deferral doctrine should take into account 
both Penn Plaza and Judge Edwards’s waiver theory, but should do so sepa-
rately by distinguishing carefully between the treatment of charges claiming 
the deprivation of waivable § 7 rights subject to union control or waiver and 
                                                                                                                           
 126 Cf. Wright v. Univ. Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 82 (1998) (union waiver of judicial forum to 
vindicate statutory right must be “clear and unmistakable”; general broad arbitration clause not suffi-
cient). 
 127 See supra text accompanying notes 21-29. 
 128 See supra text accompanying notes 42-44. 
 129 See supra text accompanying notes 109-11. 
 130 See supra text accompanying notes 104-07.  
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those charges claiming deprivation of § 7 rights that a union cannot waive.  
The Board’s distinction of waivable from non-waivable § 7 rights should be 
guided by the Court’s decisions in Magnavox and Metropolitan Edison.131   
The Board thus should treat employee concerted action in support of the 
continuation of an incumbent union or incumbent union leadership as it 
treats concerted action in opposition to such incumbency; neither type of 
action should be subject to union waiver.132 
Where an unfair labor practice complaint alleges that an action        
deprived represented employees only of waivable § 7 rights, and not any 
non-waivable rights, the Board should defer to a fair and regular arbitration 
award or settlement that clearly and unmistakably authorized the action.  As 
long as the complaint does not concern non-waivable rights, the Board 
should not decline to defer because the award or settlement agreement in-
terpreted the underlying collective agreement in conflict with Board doc-
trine or otherwise expressed an understanding of the law different from that 
which the Board would apply in the absence of deference.  The Board 
should take into account any law cited in the award or the settlement or the 
facts considered in the arbitration process only for the limited purpose of 
determining whether the award or settlement authorized the challenged 
action.  As explained above, in some cases an award or settlement may only 
determine that the contract did not prohibit the action, without clearly and 
unmistakably authorizing the action.133  In such cases, the award or settle-
ment does not modify or otherwise waive the statutory right and thus does 
not decide the statutory issue.  Most arbitration awards or settlements, how-
ever, are intended to authorize a challenged action, not just to preserve it 
from a contractual challenge. 
The Board should not defer a complaint alleging the deprivation of 
even waivable statutory rights to an arbitration award or settlement author-
izing the deprivation if the Board has reason to believe that the union’s 
agreement to the authorization was in breach of its duty of fair representa-
tion.  As Judge Edwards recognizes,134 such a breach invalidates the union’s 
authorization of any waiver of a represented employee’s § 7 right.  As Judge 
Edwards does not acknowledge,135 however, the Board’s current condition-
ing of deference on arbitration proceedings being “fair and regular” helps 
ensure that a union has not used an arbitration-based waiver opportunisti-
                                                                                                                           
 131 And perhaps also by my attempts to elaborate the Magnavox decision.  See supra notes 8 and 
11. 
 132 See supra text accompanying notes 87-92. 
 133 See supra text accompanying notes 64-69. 
 134 See Edwards, supra note 19, at 30. 
 135 See supra text accompanying notes 73-82. 
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cally for unprincipled or discriminatory ends, rather than in some good faith 
service of the aggregate interest of the bargaining unit.  The Board thus 
should continue to use its “fair and regular” standard for deference as a 
rigorous protection against union abuse of its authority to waive certain § 7 
rights.  The Board should have greater discretion to deny deferral because 
of concern about a union’s conflict of interests or unprincipled decision 
making than it does to find a breach of a duty of fair representation because 
the denial of deferral, unlike a breach of the duty, cannot alone threaten 
union control over the allocation of limited treasuries.136 
The Board, even when adjudicating claims of deprivation of non-
waivable § 7 rights, also should have limited discretion to defer to the    
findings of fact and contractual interpretations contained in arbitration 
awards rendered in response to fully and fairly litigated contractual griev-
ances.  The Board should exercise this discretion only in cases in which the 
union’s acceptance of the arbitration process as an alternative to Board’s 
public processes is clear and unmistakable.  Moreover, the Board’s discre-
tion in cases involving non-waivable rights should not extend to deference 
to any interpretations of statutory law that vary to any degree from the   
interpretations that would be given by the Board.  Because deference to an 
arbitrator’s interpretation of relevant statutory law constitutes acceptance of 
the union’s delegation to an arbitrator of authority to modify substantive 
rights, the Board can defer only to arbitral statutory interpretations or modi-
fications involving § 7 rights under the union’s control.  
 
                                                                                                                           
 136 See supra note 84. 
